“We had a debate about whether walking is essential to golf, and even in so seemingly trivial, or at least contained, a case as that, we couldn't agree. How can we possibly hope to agree? When the stakes are higher and when we're debating the fundamental purposes, or ends, of political community. And so, if we can't agree in what the ends or the goods of our shared public life consist in, how can we base justice and rights on some notion of what the end, or the purpose, or the good consists in? That's an important objection. So much so that much modern political theory takes that worry about disagreement over the good as its starting point, and concludes that justice and rights and constitutions should not be based on any particular conception of the good or the purposes of political life, but should, instead, provide a framework of rights that leaves people free to choose their conceptions of the good, their own conceptions of the purposes of life. Now, Mary-Kate said, "What if a person is very well suited to having a certain role, like the role of being a janitor, but wants something else, wants to reach higher, wants to choose another way of life?" So, that goes back to this question about freedom. Take our bearings as persons from roles that are said to fit our nature, shouldn't it at least be up to us to decide what those roles are? In fact, shouldn't it be up to us to define what roles are suitable to us? And that's going to take us back to the confrontation between Aristotle on the one hand and Kant and Rawls on the other. Kant and Rawls think Patrick has a point. They say precisely because people disagree in pluralist societies about the nature of the good life, we shouldn't try to base justice on any particular answer to that question. So they reject teleology, they reject the idea of tying justice to some conception of the good. What's at stake in the debate about teleology, say Rawlsian and Kantian liberals, is this; if you tie justice to a particular conception of the good, if you see justice as a matter of fit between a person and his or her roles, you don't leave room for freedom, and to be free is to be independent of any particular roles, or traditions, or conventions that may be handed down by my parents or my society. So, in order to decide as between these two broad traditions, whether Aristotle is right, or whether Kant and Rawls are right, we need to investigate whether the right is prior to the good, question one, and we need to investigate what it means to be a free person, a free moral agent. Does freedom require that I stand for toward my roles, my ends, and my purposes as an agent of choice? Or as someone trying to discover what my nature really is? Two big questions and we'll take them up next time. ”
字幕组的翻译有点蹩脚，可以参考下：
“我们有一场关于，行走是否为高尔夫的本质的讨论。就算是看上去如此不重要的事情，或者至少在这样一个案例中是这样，我们也不能够意见一致。那么我们怎么能期待，在关键程度更高时，得到意见一致？或当我们讨论政治共同体，的基本目的、或最终目的时能意见一致呢？此外，如果我们不能在——什么是存在于，我们的共同公共生活中的最终目的或者善——的意见上面一致的话,那我们怎么能把正义和权利建筑在关于什么才是最终目标、或者目的、或者善的，等一些信念上呢？
那是一条重要的反对理由，重要到如此程度，以致现代的政治理论担忧，在把善作为起始点上，会出现的分歧，并得出结论说，正义、权利和宪法不该建筑在任何特殊的善的概念、或政治生活的目的上。它们反而是应该，提供一种权利结构，它让人们自由选择，他们自己的善的观念，他们自己的生活的目的的观念。
现在，玛丽凯特说，“如果一个人是非常适合成为一个特定的角色，比如看门人的角色。但他却想要其他的东西，想要达到更高的成就，想要选择人生中的另一条道路。所以，那就回到了关于自由的这个问题。
假如我们，由角色和我们的本性之间要恰当的说法，以此来确定我们的位置。那该不该至少由我们自己决定，那些角色是什么？事实上，该不该由我们自己决定，什么角色是适合于我们的？
这就让我们回到亚里士多德为一方，而康德和罗尔斯为另一方的对抗中，康德和罗尔斯认为帕特里克有一个观点。他们说，因为在一个多元社会中，人们在关于好的生活的本质上明显会出现分歧，我们不应该去试图将正义建筑在任何特定的对上述问题的答案上。所以他们拒绝目的论。他们拒绝，将正义捆绑到一些善的概念的观念。
罗尔斯式和康德式的自由主义者在讨论目的论时，其关键之处如下：如果你把一种特定的善的概念，捆绑到正义上的话，如果你把正义视为，一个人和他或她的社会角色间，是恰当的话，你没有给自由留下空间，而想要自由就是要独立于任何特定的角色，或独立于传统，或独立于，可能是我父母留下来的惯例，或独立于我的社会。
那么，为了在这两大传统之间做出决定，究竟是亚里士多德是正确的，还是康德和罗尔斯是正确的?我们需要详细研究，权利是否优先于善？这是问题一，而且我们还需要详细研究，成为自由人，一个自由的道德主体意味着什么。难道自由会要求，作为一个选择主体的我，要去忍受自己趋向于，我的角色、我的最终目标和我的目的吗？
两大问题，而我们下次将继续它们。”
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个人观点:
You don't leave room for freedom.
目的论是为了使目的最大化进而决定分配方式的一种理论。目的论之所以有瑕疵是因为人们往往无法就事物的目的（telos）是什么达成一致的意见。
如果盲目地根据目的论来决定做法，那么所制定的规则必定是固定的，有偏见的，也就是说人们必须扮演根据目的最fit的角色，但凭什么这样最fit呢？因此，目的论没有给自由留下空间。
这也是现代哲学与古典哲学的区别。现代哲学家反对将目的维系在唯一的道德标准上。因此，既然无法达成统一的善恶观，他们所鼓励的是人们按自由选择自己认为对的东西，这才是justice. 即使我能够成为最好的看门人，我也有权利去当一个最差的建筑师。
终于有些理解了为什么巴黎左岸的存在主义者们的最高追求就是自由。
待续
独家蓝光
